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Self-driving cars have the potential to greatly improve public safety. However, their
introduction onto public roads must overcome both ethical and technical challenges.
To further understand the ethical issues of introducing self-driving cars, we conducted
two moral judgement studies investigating potential differences in the moral norms
applied to human drivers and self-driving cars. In the experiments, participants made
judgements on a series of dilemma situations involving human drivers or self-driving cars.
We manipulated which perspective situations were presented from in order to ascertain
the effect of perspective on moral judgements. Two main findings were apparent from the
results of the experiments. First, human drivers and self-driving cars were largely judged
similarly. However, there was a stronger tendency to prefer self-driving cars to act in ways
to minimize harm, compared to human drivers. Second, there was an indication that
perspective influences judgements in some situations. Specifically, when considering
situations from the perspective of a pedestrian, people preferred actions that would
endanger car occupants instead of themselves. However, they did not show such a
self-preservation tendency when the alternative was to endanger other pedestrians to
save themselves. This effect was more prevalent for judgements on human drivers
than self-driving cars. Overall, the results extend and agree with previous research,
again contradicting existing ethical guidelines for self-driving car decision making and
highlighting the difficulties with adapting public opinion to decision making algorithms.
Keywords: self-driving cars, moral judgement, ethics, virtual reality, moral dilemmas, autonomous vehicles,
artificial intelligence ethics
1. INTRODUCTION
Self-driving cars are rapidly becoming a reality. In 2016, car manufacturer Tesla announced that all
of its current cars were being equipped with the hardware necessary for autonomous driving (The
Tesla Team, 2016). Since then, Tesla has incrementally enabled autonomous and assisted driving
features via software updates (The Tesla Team, 2019). Other manufacturers have since been
following suit (see Mercer and Macaulay, 2019) and the use of partially self-driving cars, such as
these, is expected to increase within the next 20 years.
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Amajor argument supporting the development of self-driving
cars is the expected reduction in the number of traffic accidents.
For example, close to 90% of the more than 300,000 traffic
accidents resulting in injuries to people in Germany in 2017 were
caused by driver misconduct or error, such as ignoring right
of way, inappropriate following distance or speed, overtaking
faults, and driving under the influence of alcohol (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2018, p. 49). Similar observations have been made
in both the United Kingdom and the United States (National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008; Department for
Transport, 2013). These errors and misconduct can potentially
be mitigated by the introduction of self-driving cars, which
highlights their potential to improve public safety.
However, the expected reduction of accidents will need time
to be realized. Recently published statistics by the California
Department of Motor Vehicles shows that self-driving car
prototypes are involved in accidents at a similar rate as human
drivers (Favarò et al., 2017). Other reports give somewhat more
favorable numbers with a reduction of accident rates by about
one third (Marshall, 2018; Thomas, 2018). The discrepancy to the
optimistic forecasts cited above stems in part from an increase of,
for example, unexpected breaking resulting in rear-end collisions,
and the fact that even when an accident is not caused by a self-
driving car, it might still be involved in it. Thus, during a multi-
year introduction period, self-driving cars will be involved in a
substantial number of accidents and unexpected situations.
Unexpected traffic situations are often highly complex and
require split-second decisions. For this reason, human drivers
are not generally expected to be able to respond optimally and
may be excused for making wrong decisions (Trappl, 2016). Self-
driving car control systems, on the other hand, can potentially
estimate the outcome of various options within milliseconds and
take actions that factor in an extensive body of research, debate,
and legislation (Lin, 2015). The actions taken in such situations
have potentially harmful consequences for car occupants, other
traffic participants, and pedestrians. Therefore, it is important
to carefully consider the ethics of how self-driving cars will
be designed to make decisions, an issue that is the topic of
current debate (Nyholm, 2018a,b; Dietrich and Weisswange,
2019; Keeling et al., 2019).
Comprehensive guidelines for ethical decision making for
self-driving cars have been provided by the ethics commission
of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital
Infrastructure (2017). These guidelines speak out against
a standardized procedure of decision making in dilemma
situations (guideline 8). In cases of unavoidable accidents, “any
distinction based on personal features (age, gender, physical, or
mental constitution) is strictly prohibited” and “[those] parties
involved in the generation of mobility risks must not sacrifice
non-involved parties” (guideline 9). These guidelines greatly
add to the discussion and can inform the development of
decision making systems. However, it is far from obvious that
a practical implementation of these guidelines would garner
public consensus.
As pointed out by Shariff et al. (2017), and further evident
by the number of studies focusing on public opinion (see
Gkartzonikas and Gkritza, 2019, for a review) the introduction of
self-driving cars requires acceptance from the public. Empirical
research investigating public perception and beliefs can be useful
for highlighting areas problematic for the acceptance of self-
driving cars into public traffic. Such research in the area of ethical
decision making for self-driving cars has primarily focused on
human decision making as a basis. In a typical experiment,
participants make decisions pertaining to hypothetical dilemma
situations in which harm is unavoidable. Situations of this
kind, known as trolley dilemmas (Thomson, 1985), involve two
groups of people, one of which must be endangered to spare
the other. The utility of trolley dilemmas does not lie in
their use as blueprints for crash optimizations (Holstein and
Dodig-Crnkovic, 2018). Rather, they are an effective means
to elucidate which ethical values are potentially conflicting in
accident scenarios and to allow for the design of self-driving cars
informed by human values (Gerdes et al., 2019; Keeling, 2019). As
argued by Bonnefon et al. (2019), trolley dilemmas should not be
understood primarily as simulations of real-life scenarios, but as
representations of conflicts that emerge on a statistical level: the
introduction of self-driving cars will likely put different people
at risk compared to today. For example, would it be acceptable
that due to self-driving cars, fewer people are harmed in traffic,
but those who are harmed are more likely to be pedestrians than
car occupants?
Moral dilemma studies can be grouped broadly into two
paradigms: those that investigate moral judgements (what people
claim are the right actions) and those that investigate moral
actions (what people actually do in given situations). An analysis
of more than 40 million judgements on vignettes describing
hypothetical dilemma situations concluded that people generally
prefer self-driving cars to endanger fewer lives, endanger
animals over people and endanger older people over younger
people (Awad et al., 2018). Other moral judgement studies
include simulation studies by Wintersberger et al. (2017) and
Wilson et al. (2019) and vignette-based studies by Bonnefon et al.
(2016), Li et al. (2016), Meder et al. (2018), Smith (2019), and
Rhim et al. (2020). Importantly, Bonnefon et al. (2016) found
a discrepancy between what people deemed acceptable for self-
driving cars to do in dilemma situations and their willingness
to purchase cars that would act accordingly. Specifically, people
considered it more morally acceptable for self-driving cars to
endanger fewer lives, even at the expense of the occupants’ lives,
but preferred to purchase cars that would protect occupants.
Martin et al. (2017) suggested that this discrepancy may be
resolved if people explicitly consider the situations from both the
perspectives of car occupants and pedestrians. Borenstein et al.
(2019) highlighted that the perspectives of pedestrians and other
non-occupants is overshadowed by the focus on car occupants in
the literature, but are equally important.
Studies of moral action have used virtual reality environments
to determine how human drivers would act when faced with
dilemma situations. In these studies, participants were put in
the perspective of drivers and controlled the steering of virtual
vehicles when facing such dilemma situations. Skulmowski et al.
(2014) placed participants in the role of train drivers and found
participants generally preferred to save the greater number of
lives. Sütfeld et al. (2017) found that the behavior of participants
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in the role of car drivers could be well described by a value-
of-life model, such that people are valued more than animals
and younger people are valued more than older. Faulhaber
et al. (2018) (further elaborated by Bergmann et al., 2018), Li
et al. (2019) showed that car drivers also tend to act in ways
that endanger fewer lives, even at the expense of their own.
Ju et al. (2019) found that personality characteristics predict
the likelihood of drivers endangering themselves. Furthermore,
Luzuriaga et al. (2019) directly compared actions chosen by
participants tasked with programming a self-driving car with
actions made by participants in a driving simulator. They
found that participants programming a self-driving car more
readily endangered car occupants to save pedestrians, than
participants driving in a simulator. Thus, our knowledge
of how humans act in critical situations in virtual reality
is increasing.
While the results of these moral judgement and moral action
studies have been generally consistent, there are important
distinctions between the approaches needing consideration
before making strong conclusions. First, there is growing
evidence of discrepancies between what people consider to be
the right action in moral dilemmas and what they would actually
do (e.g., FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Tassy et al., 2013; Patil et al.,
2014; Gold et al., 2015; Francis et al., 2016). Additionally,
what is generally considered ethical for human drivers may not
be the same for self-driving cars. Furthermore, the perspective
from which the situations are presented may affect how they
are evaluated.
To address aforementioned issues, we conducted two studies
in the moral judgements paradigm which allowed us to
investigate moral beliefs about self-driving cars and human
drivers in dilemmas situations from different perspectives. In
both studies, we recorded judgements pertaining to virtual
dilemma situations involving either self-driving cars or human
drivers. We included the perspectives of car occupants,
uninvolved observers and pedestrians, which to our knowledge,
no previous studies have done. Study 1 employed virtual reality
to investigate judgements in specific dilemma situations, while
Study 2 used simplified animations and varied aspects of the
situations in a more fine-grained manner.
2. STUDY 1—MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN
VIRTUAL REALITY
In this study, we addressed the effects of perspective (passenger,
pedestrian, or observer) and type of motorist (human driver
or self-driving car) on moral judgements in immersive
virtual environments. We investigated three different scenarios,
all involving the choice between endangering one of two
groups of virtual avatars. The scenarios were designed to
be morally ambiguous to avoid ceiling or floor effects. We
hypothesized a self-preservation effect, such that, independent
of the type of motorist, participants would be less likely to
judge actions that endangered their own virtual avatars as
more acceptable.
2.1. Materials and Methods
2.1.1. Participants
One hundred and eighty-four people (96 male, 88 female)
voluntarily participated in the virtual reality experiment.
Participants were recruited through social media, university
mailing lists, word of mouth, or were directly approached.
Participants could earn experiment participation credits required
for some university programs, but no monetary incentive was
provided. Participants were required to be at least 18 years old
with native-level German and gave written informed consent
after being briefed on the content of the experiment. Exclusion
criteria included having experienced previous car-related trauma,
being prone to motion sickness and having a history of epileptic
seizures. The study was approved by the ethics review board
at Osnabrück University, Germany. Descriptive statistics of the
participants are shown in Table S1.
2.1.2. Materials
The stimuli consisted of six pairs of virtual reality animations,
each approximately 30 s in duration, created with Unity (Unity
Technologies, 2018). Each scenario involved a car with two
occupants: driver and passenger (human driver condition) or
two passengers (self-driving car condition). The car drove in the
middle of a road and encountered a dilemma situation in which
it could veer either to the left or the right, endangering one of two
groups of avatars. Animations depicting both possible actions
were shown in sequence.
To prevent unnecessary distress, the animations and sound
effects in the virtual environment ceased immediately before the
car would be involved in a collision. A braking sound effect
was played in the moments before the animations ended to
demonstrate that the car attempted, but was unable, to stop
before impact. Participants had no control over the car or avatars,
but could freely observe the virtual environment. If the motorist
was a self-driving car, the steering wheel of the car was absent
and a label was shown at the front of the car indicating that it
was self-driving in order to remind participants during the course
of the experiment. Three different scenarios were investigated:
child pedestrians vs. adult pedestrians; pedestrians on the road
vs. pedestrians on the sidewalk; and car occupants vs. pedestrians.
Each scenario included two different trials.
In the child pedestrians vs. adult pedestrians scenario the car
either veered toward a group of pedestrians including children
or a group of only adult pedestrians. The two trials differed by
group size, but the ratio was static. In the smaller groups trial,
there was one child (and an adult viewpoint avatar) in one group
and two adults (and an adult viewpoint avatar) in the other group;
in the larger groups trial, there were two children (and an adult
viewpoint avatar) in one group and four adults (and an adult
viewpoint avatar) in the other group.
In the pedestrians on the road vs. pedestrians on the sidewalk
scenario, the car veered toward either adult pedestrians standing
on the sidewalk or adult pedestrians standing on the road. The
two trials differed by group size, but the ratio was static. In the
smaller groups trial, there was one pedestrian on the sidewalk and
two pedestrians on the road; in the larger groups trial, there were
two pedestrians on the sidewalk and four on the road.
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In the car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario, the car veered
toward either the pedestrians on the road or an obstacle that
would endanger the lives of the car occupants. Instead of varying
by the size of the groups, the two trials differed by the type of
obstacle. In the parked van trial, the car would veer toward a large
van parked on the side of the road, whereas in the cliff trial, the car
would veer toward a cliff edge. Both variations of these scenarios
are equivalent in the implied outcome: either car occupants or
pedestrians will be harmed. While Faulhaber et al. (2018) only
investigated endangering car occupants in the context of a cliff
setting, we wanted to contrast this scenario with a less extreme
setting. By having the car veer toward a parked van, harm toward
car occupants is still implied, but the scenario is overall more
integrated into a typical traffic setting.
We chose these specific types of scenarios as they allow us to
contribute to related findings and discussions in recent literature.
The influence of potential victims’ ages has been investigated
by Sütfeld et al. (2017), Awad et al. (2018), and Faulhaber
et al. (2018) (further elaborated by Bergmann et al., 2018). The
potential protection afforded to pedestrians on a sidewalk has
been studied in Faulhaber et al. (2018) (further elaborated by
Bergmann et al., 2018). The issue of prioritizing car occupants
or pedestrians has been theoretically discussed by Lin (2015)
and Gogoll and Müller (2016), and implemented in a multitude
of experiments including Bonnefon et al. (2016), Wintersberger
et al. (2017), Awad et al. (2018), Faulhaber et al. (2018) (further
elaborated by Bergmann et al., 2018), and Ju et al. (2019). The
three scenarios are conceptually depicted in Figure 1 and details
of the trials for each scenario are shown in Table 1.
As described, the numbers of lives at risk were unequal in
the first two scenarios. There were twice as many pedestrians on
the road compared to the sidewalk, and twice as many adults as
children. These particular ratios were chosen based on the results
from the study reported by Faulhaber et al. (2018), which were
further elaborated by Bergmann et al. (2018). The number of car
occupants and pedestrians at risk were equal in the car occupants
vs. pedestrians scenario. This ratio was anticipated to best elicit
differences between the car occupant and pedestrian perspectives,
as, barring any intrinsic bias toward pedestrians or car occupants,
both should be equally valued.
2.1.3. Design
We employed a 4 (perspective) × 2 (motorist-type) between-
participants factorial design. The two levels of motorist-type
were self-driving car and human driver. The four levels of
perspective were passenger, observer, pedestrian in the smaller
group and pedestrian in the larger group. We used a between-
participant design to prevent experimental confounds such as
recognition of the trials and attempts to be self-consistent. As
decisions made during previous trials could be easily recalled,
we considered that a within-participant design would not have
allowed us to distinguish whether participants were influenced
more by the experimental manipulations or by their previous
responses. Thus, variables were manipulated in such a way that
each participant saw all trials from the same perspective and
involving the same motorist-type. To control for gender effects
such as those described by Skulmowski et al. (2014), the genders
of all human avatars in the virtual environment were matched to
each participant.
2.1.4. Procedure
Participants were assigned via permuted block randomization to
one of the eight conditions corresponding to the combinations of
perspective and motorist-type (e.g., observer and human driver;
car occupant and self-driving car). Participants of the smaller
and larger pedestrian groups shared the same car occupants vs.
pedestrians trials as there was only one pedestrian group involved
TABLE 1 | Outline of trials for Study 1.
Scenario Trial Groups at risk
Children vs.
Adults
Smaller
groups
1 child (+ viewpoint avatar† ) vs.
2 adults (+ viewpoint avatar† )
Larger
groups
2 children (+ viewpoint avatar†) vs.
4 adults (+ viewpoint avatar† )
Sidewalk vs.
Road
Smaller
groups
1 adult on sidewalk vs.
2 adults on road
Larger
groups
2 adults on sidewalk vs.
4 adults on road
Car occupants vs.
Pedestrians
Parked van 2 adult car occupants vs.
2 adults on road
Cliff 2 adult car occupants vs.
2 adults on road
†
To avoid the artificiality of presenting the scenarios from the perspective of a child,
additional adult avatars were added to both groups in the children vs. adults scenario,
from which the pedestrian perspectives were presented.
FIGURE 1 | Pictorial representations of the three scenarios in Study 1. The relative numbers of orange figures in each scenario represent the ratios between the two
groups at risk (assuming a single car occupant). The arrows indicate possible car actions and are colored corresponding to the graphs in Figure 2. (A) Children vs.
adults scenario; (B) Sidewalk vs. road scenario; (C) Car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario.
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in those scenarios. Participants completed a practice trial and a
control trial before the experimental trials. The six experimental
trials as well as animations within each trial were shown in
random order; trials were separated by distraction tasks. After
viewing a pair of animations, participants could replay the pair
as many times as they wanted. Participants were then asked to
choose which of the two actions of the motorist they considered
to be more acceptable by selecting the corresponding outcome
image. In accordance with Mandel and Vartanian (2007), after
making each judgement, participants indicated how confident
they were in it on a scale from 0 (not confident at all) to 100
(very confident). Decision confidence inmoral dilemmas has also
been previously investigated by Parkinson et al. (2011), Royzman
et al. (2014), and Lee et al. (2018), as it gives further information
than merely the binary choice. Specifically, the confidence
ratings provide information on how conflicted participants were
about the corresponding judgements. High scores on confidence
indicate more robust judgements than lower scores. Thus, the
proportions of judgements and the corresponding confidence
levels should be considered in parallel.
After the experiment ended, participants completed a
short questionnaire on demographics, driving experience, prior
knowledge of self-driving cars and their attitudes toward them.
Furthermore, as a manipulation check, participants reported
which party in the situation they identified most with while
watching the animations by responding to the question “while
watching the animations, which party did you identify most
strongly with?”. The options were the pedestrians, the car
occupants or the observer. Finally, they were asked whether
the motorist was a human driver or a self-driving car. Those
participants who failed the control task or were not able
to recollect the correct motorist-type in the self-driving car
condition were excluded.
2.1.5. Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018)
using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) for model fitting. Significance
testing was performed using parametric bootstrapping with
afex (Singmann et al., 2018) and emmeans (Lenth, 2018) was used
for follow-up multiple comparisons on the estimated marginal
means (EMMs).
Two models were computed for each of the three scenarios:
one for the prediction of judgements (which of the two actions
was considered more acceptable); the other for participants’ self-
reported confidence in their own judgements. Judgements, based
on perspective and motorist-type, were modeled by logit mixed
models. As there were two trials per participant for each dilemma,
random by-participant intercepts were included in all models.
This corresponds to the maximal random effects structure as
described by Barr (2013) and Barr et al. (2013). Significance
testing using Type-III sums of squares was performed by
parametric bootstrapping with 1,000 simulations. Confidence,
based on judgement, perspective, motorist, and trial was modeled
by linear mixed models. Significance testing using Type-III sums
of squares was performed using Kenward-Roger test. Along with
trial (smaller groups/larger groups in the first two scenarios,
parked van/cliff in the third scenario), the following covariates
were included: gender, age, positive opinion of self-driving cars,
visual acuity, education level, and driving experience. Models
without covariates are reported in the Supplementary Material,
but did not result in different conclusions. Results for the three
scenarios are reported separately.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Manipulation Check
To determine whether varying the visual perspective affected
which party participants self-identified with, we performed a
chi-squared test of independence, comparing participants’ self-
identification with the perspective from which they experienced
the situations (Table S2). The majority of participants identified
most strongly with the perspective from which they experienced
the scenarios χ2(24, N = 184) = 114.11, p < 0.0001. Follow up
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons showed all three perspective
groups had significantly different patterns of responses from
each other (all p < 0.0001) (Table S3). Thus, the manipulation
check indicates that in most cases participants identified with the
intended perspective.
2.2.2. Children vs. Adults
Next, we investigated the influence of perspective and motorist-
type on judgements on the children vs. adults scenario.
According to model predictions, endangering the larger group,
which consisted of only adult pedestrians, was considered more
acceptable than endangering the smaller group, which consisted
of adults and children (probability = 0.71). Figure 2A depicts
the predicted probability of judgements and levels of confidence
separated by perspective and motorist-type based on the
statistical model. There were no significant effects of perspective
or motorist-type on judgements (Table 2). The predicted mean
self-confidence in judgements (on a 0–100 scale) was 49.92,
however it varied considerably between conditions. There was
a significant main effect of perspective (p = 0.0017) moderated
by judgement (p = 0.0222) on self-reported confidence in
judgements (Table 3). Within those who chose endangering the
larger group (of only adults) as more acceptable, participants in
the observer perspective had significantly lower confidence in
their choices (EMM = 35.86) than either the pedestrian with
children (EMM = 58.57) or the pedestrian with adults (EMM =
55.62) perspectives, p = 0.0178, p = 0.0358, respectively. Within
those who chose endangering children as more acceptable,
participants in the pedestrian with children perspective had
significantly greater confidence (EMM = 71.87) than either the
observer (EMM = 36.13), the passenger (EMM = 41.92), or
the pedestrian with adults (EMM = 42.34), p = 0.0003, p =
0.0161, p = 0.0045, respectively (Tables S4, S5). Thus, observers
had among the lowest confidence regardless of judgement.
2.2.3. Sidewalk vs. Road
In the second scenario, we tested small groups of pedestrians
on the sidewalk against larger groups of pedestrians on the
road. Overall, endangering the smaller group was considered
more acceptable than endangering the larger group (probability
= 0.84). Thus, participants overwhelmingly considered that
endangering fewer pedestrians was more acceptable, despite
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FIGURE 2 | Model predictions for judgements and confidence (Study 1). Colored bars indicate the predicted probability of making particular judgements (indicated on
the top x-axis) and are colored corresponding to the actions shown in Figure 1. Black and white squares with error bars indicate predicted mean self-reported
confidence (95% CI) in the judgements made on a 0–100 scale (indicated on the bottom x-axis). As there were no significant effects of motorist-type, predictions are
only separated by perspective. (A) Children vs. adults scenario; (B) Sidewalk vs. road scenario; (C) Car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario (parked van trial)—note
there were no observers who preferred endangering pedestrians, so the confidence in that case could not be estimated; (D) Car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario
(cliff trial).
those pedestrians being situated on a sidewalk. Mean confidence
(on a 0–100 scale) was 62.44 and, thus, considerably greater
than in the children vs. adults scenario. Figure 2B depicts the
predicted probability of judgements and levels of confidence
separated by perspective and motorist-type based on the
model. There were no significant effects of perspective or
motorist type on judgements (Table 2). However, there was
a significant effect of gender, such that females (probability
= 0.004) were less likely to consider endangering the larger
group of pedestrians (on the road) as more acceptable than
males (probability = 0.034). Self-reported confidence depended
on judgement (Table 3), such that choosing endangering
pedestrians on the sidewalk as more acceptable was associated
with greater confidence (EMM = 68.88) than choosing
endangering pedestrians on the road (EMM = 60.93), p
= 0.0332 (Tables S6, S7). Thus, the observed differences in
confidence matches the bias in judgement in the sidewalk vs.
road scenario.
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TABLE 2 | Predictors of judgements based on separate logit mixed models for
each scenario (Study 1). p-values are calculated by parametric bootstrapping with
1,000 samples.
χ
2 df p
Children vs. adults scenario
Perspective 2.92 3 0.5205
Motorist-type 3.57 1 0.0991
Trial 1.22 1 0.2475
Perspective × motorist-type 1.60 3 0.7293
Gender 0.58 1 0.4635
Age 0.38 1 0.5972
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 11.33 4 0.0639
Education 4.47 2 0.1968
Driving experience 5.60 3 0.2070
Visual acuity 6.05 2 0.0859
Sidewalk vs. road scenario
Perspective 6.94 3 0.0986
Motorist-type 3.70 1 0.0744
Trial 5.11 1 0.0543
Perspective × motorist-type 5.50 3 0.1698
Gender 5.15 1 0.0253*
Age 0.65 1 0.4200
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 7.51 4 0.0866
Education 4.37 2 0.1512
Driving experience 6.06 3 0.1040
Visual acuity 3.81 2 0.1170
Car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario
Perspective 5.12 2 0.1399
Motorist-type 3.45 1 0.0909
Trial 68.89 1 0.0010**
Perspective × motorist-type 3.43 2 0.2452
Perspective × trial 8.58 2 0.0170*
Motorist-type × trial 2.64 1 0.1515
Perspective × motorist-type × trial 6.48 2 0.0630
Gender 0.05 1 0.8417
Age 0.62 1 0.4754
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 5.40 4 0.3083
Education 1.98 2 0.4230
Driving experience 3.28 3 0.4210
Visual acuity 5.68 2 0.0960
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
2.2.4. Car Occupants vs. Pedestrians
Finally, we investigated a scenario in which endangering car
occupants was contrasted with endangering pedestrians. As the
two trial types for this scenario were conceptually different, an
interaction with trial type was included in the model.
For the parked van trial, the vast majority preferred to
endanger the car occupants (probability = 0.99). In the cliff
trial however, this was much less likely (probability = 0.53).
Mean confidence was also different: 67.08 for the parked van
trial and 43.62 for the cliff trial. Figure 2C depicts the predicted
probability of judgements and levels of confidence separated
TABLE 3 | Predictors of self-reported confidence based on separate linear mixed
models for each scenario (Study 1). p-values are calculated by Kenward-Roger
test.
Num df Den df F p
Children vs. adults scenario
Perspective 3 169 5.27 0.0017**
Motorist-type 1 169 1.50 0.2230
Decision 1 325 0.09 0.7600
Trial 1 180 0.24 0.6275
Perspective × motorist-type 3 170 0.55 0.6509
Perspective × judgement 3 322 3.25 0.0222*
Motorist-type × decision 1 329 1.55 0.2139
Perspective × motorist-type × judgement 3 320 2.25 0.0823
Gender 1 164 0.04 0.8500
Age 1 159 1.68 0.1970
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 4 161 0.52 0.7180
Education 2 164 0.13 0.8825
Driving experience 3 161 0.28 0.8373
Visual acuity 2 163 0.63 0.5337
Sidewalk vs. road scenario
Perspective 3 191 2.30 0.0791
Motorist-type 1 191 0.03 0.8542
Judgement 1 338 4.57 0.0332*
Trial 1 180 1.73 0.1900
Perspective × motorist-type 3 190 1.92 0.1279
Perspective × judgement 3 332 0.78 0.5044
Motorist-type × judgement 1 338 2.47 0.1170
Perspective × motorist-type × judgement 3 332 2.12 0.0979
Gender 1 164 2.95 0.0875
Age 1 160 0.02 0.8910
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 4 161 1.10 0.3607
Education 2 161 0.23 0.7982
Driving experience 3 161 0.50 0.6810
Visual acuity 2 160 2.86 0.0603
Car occupants vs. pedestrians scenario
Perspective 2 250 1.07 0.3457
Motorist-type 1 284 0.20 0.6534
Judgement 1 326 13.77 0.0002***
Trial 1 248 7.93 0.0052**
Perspective × motorist-type 2 232 0.19 0.8263
Perspective × judgement 2 327 1.69 0.1866
Motorist-type × judgement 1 322 0.68 0.4118
Perspective × trial 2 242 2.49 0.0852
Motorist-type × trial 1 258 0.00 0.9652
Judgement × trial 1 298 10.81 0.0011**
Perspective × motorist-type × judgement 2 321 0.16 0.8508
Perspective × motorist-type × trial 2 236 0.18 0.8339
Perspective × judgement × trial 2 287 0.49 0.6112
Motorist-type × judgement × trial 1 301 0.07 0.7974
Perspective × motorist-type × judg. × trial 1 303 0.17 0.6827
Gender 1 164 0.54 0.4627
Age 1 164 0.51 0.4752
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 4 164 1.21 0.3074
Education 2 161 4.06 0.0191*
Driving experience 3 165 0.53 0.6639
Visual acuity 2 166 0.17 0.8457
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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by perspective and motorist-type for the parked van trial and
Figure 2D depicts the same for the cliff trial.
There was a significant main effect of trial-type. Participants
were more likely to consider endangering the car occupants as
more acceptable in the van trial than the cliff trial, p = 0.0010.
As falling off a cliff is more likely to result in injury or death
than colliding with a parked van, the judgements by participants
appear to take into account the degree of potential harm.
Furthermore, there was a significant trial-type × perspective
interaction. In the cliff trial, passengers were significantly less
likely than either observers (odds-ratio = 5.303, p = 0.0047)
or pedestrians (odds-ratio = 3.584, p = 0.0118) to consider
endangering the car occupants (including themselves) as more
acceptable. This indicates a self-preservation effect.
Statistical analysis of self-reported confidence was performed
only for pedestrians and car occupant perspectives as there
were no responses preferring to endanger pedestrians in the
observer perspective. There were main effects of trial (p =
0.0052) and judgement (p = 0.0002), moderated by a trial ×
judgement interaction (p= 0.0011), on self-reported confidence.
Confidence when preferring to endanger car occupants was
lower in the cliff trial (EMM = 47.8) than the parked van trial
(EMM = 75.2), p < 0.0001. This was not the case for preferring
to endanger pedestrians (EMMs = 50.4 and 55.2, respectively, p
= 0.7582) (Table S11). Note that there were no observers who
preferred endangering pedestrians in the parked van trial, so the
confidence could not be estimated and the follow up comparisons
for endangering pedestrians only considered the responses of the
other perspectives.
2.3. Study 1 Discussion
For the three scenarios, patterns of judgements aligned with
actions taken in similar dilemma studies reported by Faulhaber
et al. (2018) (further elaborated by Bergmann et al., 2018) and
Sütfeld et al. (2017): participants generally preferred motorists to
risk the lives of adult pedestrians rather than child pedestrians,
despite endangering more lives by doing so; it was highly
acceptable for a motorist to swerve onto a sidewalk in order to
endanger fewer pedestrians; and there was a tendency to protect
pedestrians over car occupants. However, it seems that the
perceived danger to the car occupants plays a role; participants
were less likely to accept a car veering toward a cliff edge, than a
car veering toward a parked van.
Only in the cliff trial of the car occupants vs. pedestrians
scenario did we observe a main effect of perspective on
judgements. There was disagreement between the car occupant
and pedestrian perspectives. Car occupants preferred the car
to remain on course and endanger the pedestrians, rather
than veering toward a cliff edge, while pedestrians preferred
the opposite. Interestingly, observers appear to agree with the
pedestrians in this case. This corresponds to a self-preservation
effect for both car occupants and pedestrians. However, it is
important to notice that this effect only arose when the situation
clearly pitted the lives of car occupants against the lives of
pedestrians. It was not prevalent between pedestrians, nor in
the parked van trial (which may have been considered as less
dangerous for the car occupants).
The collection of self-reported confidence allowed for a more
fine-grained analysis by enabling effects that were not prevalent
in the primary forced-choice response data to be investigated.
Specifically, there was an effect of perspective in the children vs.
adults scenario: observers were among the lowest in confidence,
regardless of judgement, despite there being no significant
difference in judgements themselves. This is noteworthy as
the uninvolved observer is often considered as an “objective”
viewpoint (Coeckelbergh, 2016). One might then expect the
observer perspective to be associated with high confidence, but
this is not apparent here.
3. STUDY 2—MORAL JUDGEMENTS ON
SIMPLIFIED ANIMATIONS
Our second study builds on the first investigating the influence of
perspective and motorist with the addition of investigating the
influence of the number of lives at risk and the presence of a
sidewalk. We used an online deployment platform and presented
the scenarios in the form of simplified animations. Rather than
offering an immersive experience, the goal of using simplified
animations was to illustrate the scenarios while prompting
participants to evaluate them from a particular perspective. We
consider the use of animations to be a natural extension of the
combination of simplified images and textual vignettes, as used in
previous studies (Bonnefon et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016; Awad et al.,
2018). As such a combination has been shown by Sachdeva et al.
(2015) to sufficiently manipulate perspective in moral dilemmas,
simplified animations should similarly prompt participants to
consider situations from the presented perspective. Nevertheless,
a manipulation check was included in the analysis to confirm that
such an effect occurred.
We tested whether increasing the number of lives at risk
by staying on course increases the acceptability of swerving
to endanger a single life. Further, we tested whether swerving
onto a sidewalk would be less acceptable than swerving onto
another road. We hypothesized that perspective would influence
judgements, such that participants would be less likely to consider
endangering their own avatars as the more acceptable action.
3.1. Materials and Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Three hundred and sixty-eight people (176 male, 191 female,
1 other) voluntarily participated in this online animation-based
experiment. Participants indicated their age groups, the median
of which was 18–29 years old. Participants were recruited
through social media, university mailing lists and word of mouth.
Twenty-four different countries were represented, with major
participation from Germany, Armenia, Australia, and Russia.
The study was approved by the ethics review board at Osnabrück
University, Germany. Descriptive statistics of the participants are
given in Table S12.
3.1.2. Materials
The stimuli consisted of animations of five seconds in length
made with Blender (Blender Online Community, 2018). Each
animation depicted a car traveling over a hill. Immediately after
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the hill, the car encountered a dilemma situation. It could either
stay on course and risk the lives of pedestrians on the road or
swerve to the side. Depending on the scenario, swerving would
direct the car either into a single pedestrian (on a road or a
sidewalk) or the side of a passing freight train. The animations
ended shortly before impact to avoid unnecessary distress for
participants. To manipulate the perspective, each animation
depicted a scenario from either a bird’s-eye view; a first-person
perspective of a pedestrian; or a first-person perspective of the
car occupant (Figure 3).
3.1.3. Design
Two scenarios were investigated in this study (pedestrian
vs. pedestrian; car occupants vs. pedestrians). While the two
associated designs differed in important ways, the general
framework was the same. Four different lives-at-risk situations
were investigated; swerving always endangered a single life, but
staying on course endangered from 1 to 4 lives, depending on
the trial.
For the pedestrians vs. single pedestrian scenario we employed
a 2 (motorist-type) × 4 (perspective) × 2 (road-type) × 4
(lives-at-risk) mixed factorial design. There were two levels
of motorist-type (self-driving car, human driver), and four of
perspective (car occupant, pedestrian-straight-ahead, pedestrian-
on-the-side, observer). All participants saw the two levels of
road-type (split-road, road-with-sidewalk) and lives-at-risk (1
vs. 1, 2 vs. 1, 3 vs. 1, and 4 vs. 1). Motorist-type and
perspective were manipulated between-participants, while road-
type and lives-at-risk were manipulated within-participants.
Thus, each participant witnessed all pedestrians vs. single
pedestrian scenario from a single perspective involving a single
motorist-type.
For the pedestrians vs. car occupant scenario we employed
a 2 (motorist-type) × 3 (perspective) × 4 (lives-at-risk) mixed
factorial design. Motorist-type had two levels (self-driving,
human-driven) and perspective had three levels (car occupant,
pedestrian straight ahead, observer). All participants saw all four
levels of lives-at-risk (1 vs. 1, 2 vs. 1, 3 vs. 1, and 4 vs. 1). Motorist-
type and perspective were manipulated between-participants,
while lives-at-risk was manipulated within-participants. Thus,
each participant witnessed all occupant vs. pedestrian dilemmas
from a single perspective involving a single motorist-type.
3.1.4. Procedure
Participants were given a link to an animation-based online
survey, created and hosted on LabVanced, an online platform for
social science experiments (Finger et al., 2017). Upon starting
the study, participants were randomly allocated into one of
the eight conditions described above, corresponding to the
combinations of motorist-type and perspective in the larger
design. Participants in observer and car occupant perspectives
were presented both scenarios, as described above. However, the
participants allocated to the pedestrian on-the-side perspective
did not view the pedestrians vs. car occupant scenario, as
there was no corresponding viewpoint in these animations. A
single trial consisted of a pair of animations depicting the same
situation. One animation showed the car staying on course, the
other showed it swerving to the side. The order of the two
animations was counterbalanced across trials. After viewing the
pair of animations, images of the final frames of each animation
were presented side-by-side. Participants were asked to choose
which of the two actions was more acceptable by clicking on
the corresponding image. Throughout the trials, a textual notice
reminded participants about both the perspective from which
they are viewing the scenarios and the type of motorist depicted.
All experimental trials were completed in random order. The
experiment always began with a control trial; participants who
failed it were excluded. After the experimental block, participants
completed a short questionnaire on demographics, driving
experience, prior knowledge of self-driving cars, and opinion
toward them. Furthermore, participants were asked whether they
identified more with the pedestrians or the car occupant while
watching the animations with the question: “while watching the
animations, which party did you most strongly identify with?”
The options were: the car, the pedestrians.
3.1.5. Statistical Analysis
As with the first study, statistical analyses were conducted in R (R
Core Team, 2018) using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) for model fitting.
Significance testing was performed using likelihood ratio tests
with afex (Singmann et al., 2018) and emmeans (Lenth, 2018)
was used for follow-up multiple comparisons on the estimated
marginal means (EMMs).
Following the study design, the two scenarios were analyzed
individually. For both, we modeled the likelihood of choosing
swerving to the side as more acceptable than staying on course
based on lives-at-risk, road-type, perspective and motorist-type,
using generalized linear mixed models with logit link functions.
To control for individual differences, we implemented maximal
random-effects structures as suggested by Barr (2013) and Barr
et al. (2013). In the pedestrian vs. pedestrian dilemmas, due to
convergence issues, the maximal random effects structure was
replaced with a sub-maximal structure, without the random slope
for lives-at-risk. The following covariates were included in all
models: gender, age, knowledge of self-driving cars, and opinion
of self-driving cars.
3.2. Results
Similar to Study 1, we first performed a manipulation check
to determine if the perspective from which participants viewed
the scenarios affected with which party they identified most
strongly. The omnibus goodness-of-fit test was significant, χ2(24,
N = 350) = 60.66, p < 0.0001. The majority of participants
in the pedestrian or car occupant perspectives identified most
strongly with the corresponding perspective. Approximately
equal numbers of participants in the observer perspective
identified with car occupants and pedestrians (Tables S13, S14).
Thus, the manipulation check indicates that in most cases
participants identify with the allocated perspective and the
observer perspective was not biased.
Next, we investigated the effects of the perspective, motorist-
type, road-type and lives-at-risk on judgements on the pedestrian
vs. pedestrian dilemma (Table 4). There was a significant main
effect of lives-at-risk (p < 0.0001). With increasing imbalance
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FIGURE 3 | Final frames from animations for the pedestrians vs. car occupant scenario (Study 2). The car either stays on course, endangering two pedestrians (top
row), or swerves into a freight train, endangering the car occupant (bottom row). Different perspectives are shown: car occupant perspective (left column), observer
perspective (middle column), pedestrian perspective (right column). Images depict 2v1 lives-at-risk (2 pedestrians vs. 1 car occupant). The animations used graphical
models based on those by Jim van Hazendonk (https://racoon.media/) and Clint Bellanger (http://clintbellanger.net/).
TABLE 4 | Predictors of judgements based on separate logit mixed models for
each scenario (Study 2). p-values are calculated via likelihood ratio tests.
df χ2 χ2 df p
Pedestrians vs. single pedestrian scenario
Lives-at-risk 46 899.92 3 <0.0001***
Perspective 46 2.99 3 0.3928
Motorist-type 48 2.19 1 0.1389
Road-type 48 9.87 1 0.0017**
Lives-at-risk × perspective 40 70.19 9 <0.0001***
Lives-at-risk × motorist-type 46 1.72 3 0.6316
Perspective × motorist-type 46 0.96 3 0.8108
Lives-at-risk × road-type 46 2.97 3 0.3956
Motorist-type × road-type 48 0.98 1 0.3214
Lives-at-risk × perspective × motorist-type 40 20.47 9 0.0152*
Lives-at-risk × motorist-type × road-type 46 0.84 3 0.8409
First animation 48 0.01 1 0.9305
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 45 12.92 4 0.0117*
Knowledge of self-driving cars 48 1.29 1 0.2566
Pedestrians vs. car occupant scenario
Lives-at-risk 28 123.35 3 <0.0001***
Perspective 29 1.95 2 0.3767
Motorist-type 30 0.94 1 0.3319
Lives-at-risk × perspective 25 7.13 6 0.3086
Lives-at-risk × motorist-type 28 6.93 3 0.0742
Perspective × motorist-type 29 2.36 2 0.3079
Lives-at-risk × perspective × motorist-type 25 14.07 6 0.0288*
First animation 30 0.01 1 0.9190
Positive opinion of self-driving cars 27 10.20 4 0.0371*
Knowledge of self-driving cars 30 5.71 1 0.0168*
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
of the number of pedestrians endangered, the probability of
swerving changed steeply from close to 0.0 to nearly 1.0. Further,
we observed a significant main effect of road-type (p= 0.0002).
Participants tended to perceive swerving as more acceptable
when swerving onto another road (probability= 0.88) than onto
a sidewalk (probability= 0.76), odds-ratio= 2.50 (Table S16).
Generally, increases in lives-at-risk were positively associated
with the probability of preferring to swerve (the more lives
at risk by staying, the higher the probability of preferring to
swerve). However, the nuances of this relationship depended on
perspective and motorist-type and their interaction (Table S17).
Lives-at-risk interacted with perspective (p < 0.0001) and we
observed a three-way interaction of lives-at-risk × perspective
×motorist-type (p= 0.0152) (Figure 4). Specifically, comparing
the case of 2v1 lives-at-risk, the probability of swerving was
higher for car occupant and observer perspectives than for
pedestrian perspectives. Furthermore, there was a difference in
the case of 2v1 lives-at-risk from the pedestrian-straight-ahead
perspective between human driver and self-driving car. Follow
up comparisons of the lives-at-risk × perspective × motorist-
type interaction indicated that in all except one condition,
acceptability of swerving was significantly higher at 2 vs. 1
compared to 1 vs. 1 lives-at-risk, all p < 0.0001 (Table S18). The
exception to this was for participants who judged human drivers
from the perspective of pedestrians-straight-ahead. In their case,
this increase only occurred at 3 vs. 1 lives-at-risk (odds-ratio =
31.67, p < 0.0001). This indicates that perspective may affect
how human drivers’ actions are perceived, and at which point it
is considered appropriate for them to intervene.
In the next scenario, car occupants were weighed against
pedestrians. There was a significant main effect of lives-at-risk
(p < 0.0001) and a significant lives-at-risk × perspective ×
motorist-type interaction (p = 0.0288) (Table 4). Preferring to
swerve was generally positively associated with lives-at-risk. In
all conditions, swerving was significantly more acceptable at 4 vs.
1 lives-at-risk compared to 1 vs. 1 lives-at-risk (all p < 0.05). For
judgements on self-driving cars this increase occurred between
1 vs. 1 and 2 vs. 1 lives-at-risk, while for judgements on human
drivers, this point depended on perspective. For those in the car
occupant perspective, there was no significant difference between
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FIGURE 4 | Model predictions for judgements on the pedestrians vs. single pedestrian scenario (Study 2). Height of bars indicate the probability of choosing “swerve”
(endanger a single pedestrian to the side) as more acceptable. Different perspectives are separated in columns, combinations of motorist-type, and road-type are
separated in rows.
1 vs. 1 and 2 vs. 1 lives-at-risk (p = 0.0604), but there was a
significant difference between 1 vs. 1 and 3 vs. 1 conditions (odds-
ratio = 68.02, p = 0.0001). For both observers and pedestrians,
this occurred only after 4 vs. 1 lives-at-risk, odds-ratios = 20.42
(p = 0.0011) and 11.97 (p = 0.0136), respectively. However, in
the latter case, this was due to the already high acceptability of
swerving at 1 vs. 1 lives-at-risk (probability= 0.68). These results
are depicted in Figure 5. Thus, moral judgements were rather
similar in the case of self-driving cars, and were dependent on
perspective only in the case of human drivers.
3.3. Study 2 Discussion
In this study we observed that increasing the number of people in
the direct path of a car led to higher acceptability of swerving to
endanger a single life. Generally, when two or more pedestrians
were in danger, the probability of preferring to swerve was
substantially higher than when there was only a single pedestrian
in danger. This is in line with previous studies, reporting a high
sensitivity of participants to the number of lives at risk. Further,
we observe that swerving onto a sidewalk was less acceptable
than swerving onto a connecting road. However, this effect was
overshadowed by the preference to minimize the number of
lives endangered. Additionally, we observed other differences
between judgements on human drivers and self-driving cars.
When swerving would endanger a pedestrian, there was general
agreement between perspectives for self-driving cars to minimize
the number of lives endangered. However, for human drivers,
this was not the case. Those in the perspective of pedestrians in
the direct path of a car only accepted a human driver swerving
when three or more pedestrians would be otherwise endangered.
All other perspectives considered it more acceptable when there
were two pedestrians in the direct path of a car (Figure 4).
When swerving would endanger car occupants, there was general
agreement between perspectives on what self-driving cars should
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FIGURE 5 | Model predictions for judgements on the pedestrians vs. car occupant scenario (Study 2). Height of bars indicate the probability of choosing “swerve”
(endanger the car occupant) as more acceptable. Different perspectives are separated in columns, different motorist-types are separated in rows.
do. It was more acceptable for self-driving cars to minimize
harm while protecting their occupants when all else was equal.
However, there was disagreement between perspectives about
which action was more acceptable for human drivers to take.
Those in the observer perspective only considered it more
acceptable for drivers to endanger themselves when faced with
four pedestrians on the road. Conversely, those in the pedestrian
perspective already considered it more acceptable for drivers to
swerve when there was a single pedestrian at risk (Figure 5).
Similar to Study 1, this indicates a self-preservation effect for
pedestrians, however only for judgements on human drivers.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both studies, we found that judgements on self-driving cars
do not seem to differ substantially from those on human drivers.
In cases where there is a discrepancy, it seems to be due to a
stronger preference for self-driving cars to minimize harm. Based
on this result, it seems that people generally expect self-driving
cars to follow the same traffic regulations as human drivers.
The experiments revealed that differences between perspectives
occur in situations where lives of car occupants are weighed
against those of pedestrians. Results from Study 1 show that
perspective seems to affect the acceptability of a car driving off
a cliff: passengers are less likely to prefer swerving off a cliff than
observers or pedestrians. Study 2 indicates disagreement between
perspectives when considering at which point human drivers
should intervene and endanger their own lives for the greater
good. Additionally, perspective seems to affect confidence: people
who observe a collision from a detached point of view seem to
be less confident in their judgements. Although there are many
commonalities in the judgements from different perspectives, the
identified discrepancies should be taken into consideration in
further research.
Results from our studies on moral judgement generally align
with those from previous studies of moral action, in which
participants were in the roles of drivers in similar dilemma
scenarios (Sütfeld et al., 2017; Faulhaber et al., 2018). This
indicates that the discrepancy between moral action and moral
judgement (shown by e.g., Francis et al., 2016) may not be
extremely pronounced in driving-related dilemmas presented
in virtual environments. Thus, previous studies on the topic
should be considered equally relevant irrespective of whether
they focused on moral judgement or action.
One of the more controversial aspects of introducing self-
driving cars may concern the endangering of pedestrians on
sidewalks. According to our results, pedestrians on a sidewalk
seem to be offered more protection than pedestrians on the
road when the numbers of lives at risk are equal (Figure 4).
However, this protection is overshadowed by the preference to
endanger fewer lives (Figure 2B). This opposes prominent ethical
guidelines such as those issued by the ethics commission of the
German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
(2017), which states that non-involved parties (e.g., pedestrians
on a sidewalk) should not be endangered. Similar divergence
occurs when a dilemma involves clearly risking the lives of car
occupants or children, as there is no general agreement between
people’s judgements on what is considered more acceptable.
However, the guidelines state that personal features, such as age,
should not be taken into consideration in unavoidable accident
situations. While ethical guidelines are important to consider,
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another aspect to consider is legality. In research by Awad et al.
(2018) and Li et al. (2019), the legal liability of different parties
involved in a situation (for example whether pedestrians were
crossing legally or not) was shown to affect judgements. However
these studies did not consider the interplay between the type of
motorist, perspective and legality, something that future research
should aim to elucidate.
Our studies aimed to expand understanding of moral
psychology in the context of artificial intelligence. This research
assists in determining criteria that self-driving car decision
making needs to meet in order to be commonly accepted.
However, we want to stress that responses to simplified dilemma
situations should not be the basis for legal or ethical regulations.
Furthermore, in agreement with Keeling (2017) and Nyholm
(2018a), we believe empirical research alone cannot answer the
ethical question of how self-driving cars should be programmed
to behave. Nevertheless, we believe the results provide insights
into the public’s preferences regarding the decision making of
self-driving cars and potential conflicts that may arise. The
results from our studies point to specific questions warranting
further investigation and attention in the debate surrounding
the introduction of self-driving cars. In particular, these relate
to the lack of agreement regarding specific dilemmas, apparent
discrepancies between public opinion and ethical guidelines,
the effects of perspective, the identified self-preservation effect
and the albeit slight differences between judgements on self-
driving cars and human drivers. These findings all highlight
issues with creating decision making algorithms that attempt
to simultaneously consider intuitions, ethical guidelines, and
legal regulations.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for the studies are included in the
Supplementary Material.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The studies involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by Ethics Commission of Osnabrück University. The
participants provided their informed consent to participate in
the studies.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
PK, GP, and AS conceived of the initial research idea, gave
feedback to the experimental designs, provided feedback and
edited the manuscript. NK, FN, MP, and JZ participated
in planning the research, collecting the data, designing the
experiments, interpreting the results, and writing themanuscript.
NK, FN, andMP participated in the creation of the materials. NK
and MP analyzed the collected data.
FUNDING
We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the
European Commission (H2020 FETPROACT-2014, SEP-
21014273, socSMCs, ID: 641321, PK), by Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), and the OpenAccess Publishing
Fund of Osnabrück University.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper was based on the work done in a student-
run research project. The authors gratefully thank Jean-
Philipp Almstedt, Linus Edelkott, David Finger, Kimberly
Gerbaulet, Gayane Ghazaryan, Anastasia Mukhina, Iryna Ruda,
and Robert Sartorius for their valuable contributions to
the project.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.
2019.02415/full#supplementary-material
Data Sheet 1 | Study 1 data.
Data Sheet 2 | Study 2 data.
Data Sheet 3 | Additional information for methods and results.
REFERENCES
Awad, E., D’Souza, S., Kim, R., Schulz, J., Henrich, J., Shariff, A.,
et al. (2018). The Moral Machine experiment. Nature 563, 59–64.
doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0637-6
Barr, D. J. (2013). Random effects structure for testing interactions in linear
mixed-effects models. Front. Psychol. 4:328. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00328
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., and Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure
for confirmatory hypothesis testing: keep it maximal. J. Mem. Lang. 68,
255–278. doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., and Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-
effects models using lme4. J. Stat. Softw. 67, 1–48. doi: 10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Bergmann, L. T., Schlicht, L., Meixner, C., König, P., Pipa, G., Boshammer, S., et al.
(2018). Autonomous vehicles require socio-political acceptance—an empirical
and philosophical perspective on the problem of moral decisionmaking. Front.
Behav. Neurosci. 12:31. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00031
Blender Online Community (2018). Blender – A 3D Modelling and Rendering
Package. Amsterdam: Blender Foundation.
Bonnefon, J., Shariff, A., and Rahwan, I. (2019). The trolley, the bull bar, and why
engineers should care about the ethics of autonomous cars [point of view].
Proc. IEEE 107, 502–504. doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2019.2897447
Bonnefon, J.-F., Shariff, A., and Rahwan, I. (2016). The social dilemma of
autonomous vehicles. Science 352, 1573–1576. doi: 10.1126/science.aaf2654
Borenstein, J., Herkert, J., and Miller, K. W. (2019). Autonomous vehicles and
the ethical tension between occupant and non-occupant safety. Comput. Ethics
Philos. Enq. Proc. 2019:6. doi: 10.25884/2vx8-3c55
Coeckelbergh, M. (2016). Responsibility and the moral phenomenology
of using self-driving cars. Appl. Artif. Intell. 30, 748–757.
doi: 10.1080/08839514.2016.1229759
Department for Transport (2013). Contributory Factors for Reported Road
Accidents (RAS50). Available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistical-data-sets/ras50-contributory-factors (accessed July 10, 2019).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2415
Kallioinen et al. Moral Judgements on Actions of Self-Driving Cars
Dietrich, M., and Weisswange, T. H. (2019). Distributive justice as an ethical
principle for autonomous vehicle behavior beyond hazard scenarios. Ethics Inf.
Technol. 21, 227–239. doi: 10.1007/s10676-019-09504-3
Faulhaber, A. K., Dittmer, A., Blind, F., Wächter, M. A., Timm, S., Sütfeld,
L. R., Stephan, A., et al. (2018). Human decisions in moral dilemmas
are largely described by utilitarianism: virtual car driving study provides
guidelines for autonomous driving vehicles. Sci. Eng. Ethics 25, 399–418.
doi: 10.1007/s11948-018-0020-x
Favarò, F. M., Nader, N., Eurich, S. O., Tripp, M., and Varadaraju, N. (2017).
Examining accident reports involving autonomous vehicles in California. PLoS
ONE 12:e0184952. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0184952
FederalMinistry of Transport andDigital Infrastructure (2017). Ethics Commission
Report: Automated and Connected Driving. Technical report. Available
online at: https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/publications/report-ethics-
commission.pdf (accessed July 10, 2019).
FeldmanHall, O., Mobbs, D., Evans, D., Hiscox, L., Navrady, L., and
Dalgleish, T. (2012). What we say and what we do: the relationship
between real and hypothetical moral choices. Cognition 123, 434–441.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.02.001
Finger, H., Goeke, C., Diekamp, D., Standvoß, K., and König, P. (2017).
“LabVanced: a unified JavaScript framework for online studies,” in 2017
International Conference on Computational Social Science IC2S2 (Cologne).
Francis, K. B., Howard, C., Howard, I. S., Gummerum, M., Ganis, G., Anderson,
G., et al. (2016). Virtual morality: transitioning from moral judgment
to moral action? PLoS ONE 11:e0164374. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.01
64374
Gerdes, J. C., Thornton, S. M., andMillar, J. (2019). “Designing automated vehicles
around human values,” in Road Vehicle Automation 6, eds G. Meyer and
S. Beiker (Orlando, FL: Springer International Publishing), 39–48.
Gkartzonikas, C., and Gkritza, K. (2019). What have we learned? a review of stated
preference and choice studies on autonomous vehicles. Transport. Res. Part C
98, 323–337. doi: 10.1016/j.trc.2018.12.003
Gogoll, J., and Müller, J. F. (2016). Autonomous cars: in favor of a mandatory
ethics setting. Sci. Eng. Ethics. 23, 681–700. doi: 10.1007/s11948-016-
9806-x
Gold, N., Pulford, B. D., and Colman, A. M. (2015). Do as I say, don’t do
as I do: differences in moral judgments do not translate into differences
in decisions in real-life trolley problems. J. Econ. Psychol. 47, 50–61.
doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.001
Holstein, T., and Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2018). “Avoiding the intrinsic unfairness of
the trolley problem,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Software
Fairness, FairWare ’18 (New York, NY: ACM), 32–37.
Ju, U., Kang, J., and Wallraven, C. (2019). To brake or not to brake? Personality
traits predict decision-making in an accident situation. Front. Psychol. 10:134.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00134
Keeling, G. (2017). Commentary: Using virtual reality to assess ethical decisions in
road traffic scenarios: applicability of value-of-life-based models and influences
of time pressure. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 11:247. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.201
7.00247
Keeling, G. (2019). Why trolley problems matter for the ethics of automated
vehicles. Sci. Eng. Ethics. doi: 10.1007/s11948-019-00096-1. [Epub ahead of
print].
Keeling, G., Evans, K., Thornton, S. M., Mecacci, G., and de Sio, F. S. (2019).
“Four perspectives on what matters for the ethics of automated vehicles,” in
Road Vehicle Automation 6, eds G. Meyer and S. Beiker (Orlando, FL: Springer
International Publishing), 49–60.
Lee, M., Sul, S., and Kim, H. (2018). Social observation increases deontological
judgments in moral dilemmas. Evol. Hum. Behav. 39, 611–621.
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.06.004
Lenth, R. (2018). emmeans: Estimated Marginal Means, Aka Least-Squares Means.
R package version 1.1.
Li, J., Zhao, X., Cho, M.-J., Ju, W., and Malle, B. F. (2016). “From trolley to
autonomous vehicle: perceptions of responsibility and moral norms in traffic
accidents with self-driving cars,” in SAE 2016 World Congress and Exhibition
(Detroit, MI: SAE International).
Li, S., Zhang, J., Li, P., Wang, Y., and Wang, Q. (2019). Influencing factors of
driving decision-making under the moral dilemma. IEEE Access 7, 104132–
104142. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2932043
Lin, P. (2015). “Why ethics matters for autonomous cars,” in Autonomes Fahren,
edsM.Maurer, J. Christian Gerdes, B. Lenz, andH.Winner (Berlin; Heidelberg:
Springer), 69–85. doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-45854-9_4
Luzuriaga, M., Heras, A., and Kunze, O. (2019). Hurting others vs. hurting
myself, a dilemma for our autonomous vehicle. SSRN Electron. J.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3345141. [Epub ahead of print].
Mandel, D. R., and Vartanian, O. (2007). Taboo or tragic: effect of tradeoff
type on moral choice, conflict, and confidence. Mind Soc. 7, 215–226.
doi: 10.1007/s11299-007-0037-3
Marshall, A. (2018). Tesla’s favorite autopilot safety statistic doesn’t hold
up. Wired. Available online at: https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-autopilot-
safety-statistics/ (accessed July 10, 2019).
Martin, R., Kusev, I., Cooke, A. J., Baranova, V., Schaik, P. V., and Kusev, P. (2017).
Commentary: The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. Front. Psychol. 8.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00808
Meder, B., Fleischhut, N., Krumnau, N.-C., and Waldmann, M. R. (2018). How
should autonomous cars drive? A preference for defaults in moral judgments
under risk and uncertainty. Risk Anal. 39, 295–314. doi: 10.1111/risa.13178
Mercer, C., and Macaulay, T. (2019). Which companies are making driverless
cars? Techworld. Available online at: https://www.techworld.com/picture-
gallery/data/-companies-working-on-driverless-cars-3641537/ (accessed July
10, 2019).
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2008). Report to Congress:
Doths811059. Technical report, U.S. Department of Transportation. Available
online at: https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811059
Nyholm, S. (2018a). The ethics of crashes with self-driving cars: a roadmap, I.
Philos. Compass 13:e12507. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12507
Nyholm, S. (2018b). The ethics of crashes with self-driving cars: a roadmap, II.
Philos. Compass 13:e12506. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12506
Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P. E., Mendelovici, A., McGeer,
V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is morality unified? evidence that distinct neural
systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 23, 3162–3180. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00017
Patil, I., Cogoni, C., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L., and Silani, G. (2014).
Affective basis of judgment-behavior discrepancy in virtual experiences of
moral dilemmas. Soc. Neurosci. 9, 94–107. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2013.8
70091
R Core Team (2018). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Rhim, J., Lee, G., and Lee, J.-H. (2020). Human moral reasoning types in
autonomous vehicle moral dilemma: a cross-cultural comparison of Korea
and Canada. Comput. Hum. Behav. 102, 39–56. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.201
9.08.010
Royzman, E. B., Landy, J. F., and Leeman, R. F. (2014). Are thoughtful people more
utilitarian? CRT as a unique predictor of moral minimalism in the dilemmatic
context. Cogn. Sci. 39, 325–352. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12136
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., Ekhtiari, H., and Dehghani, M. (2015). The
role of self-sacrifice in moral dilemmas. PLoS ONE 10:e0127409.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0127409
Shariff, A., Bonnefon, J.-F., and Rahwan, I. (2017). Psychological roadblocks
to the adoption of self-driving vehicles. Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 694–696.
doi: 10.1038/s41562-017-0202-6
Singmann, H., Bolker, B., Westfall, J., and Aust, F. (2018). afex: Analysis of
Factorial Experiments. R package version 0.19-1.
Skulmowski, A., Bunge, A., Kaspar, K., and Pipa, G. (2014). Forced-
choice decision-making in modified trolley dilemma situations: a
virtual reality and eye tracking study. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 8:426.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00426
Smith, B. (2019). Personality facets and ethics positions as directives for self-
driving vehicles. Technol. Soc. 57, 115–124. doi: 10.1016/j.techsoc.2018.12.006
Statistisches Bundesamt (2018). Verkehr: Verkehrsunfälle. Technical Report Reihe
7, Statistisches Bundesamt. Available online at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/
Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Verkehrsunfaelle/Publikationen/Downloads-
Verkehrsunfaelle/verkehrsunfaelle-jahr-2080700177004.pdf
Sütfeld, L. R., Gast, R., König, P., and Pipa, G. (2017). Using virtual reality to
assess ethical decisions in road traffic scenarios: applicability of value-of-life-
based models and influences of time pressure. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 11:122.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00122
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2415
Kallioinen et al. Moral Judgements on Actions of Self-Driving Cars
Tassy, S., Oullier, O., Mancini, J., and Wicker, B. (2013). Discrepancies between
judgment and choice of action in moral dilemmas. Front. Psychol. 4:250.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00250
The Tesla Team (2016). All tesla cars being produced now have full self-driving
hardware. Tesla Blog. Available online at: https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-
cars-being-produced-now-have-full-self-driving-hardware (accessed July 10,
2019).
The Tesla Team (2019). Introducing a more seamless navigate on autopilot.
Tesla Blog. Available online at: https://www.tesla.com/blog/introducing-more-
seamless-navigate-autopilot (accessed July 10, 2019).
Thomas, B. A. (2018). A closer inspection of tesla’s autopilot safety statistics. Wired.
Available online at: https://medium.com/@mc2maven/a-closer-inspection-of-
teslas-autopilot-safety-statistics-533eebe0869d (accessed July 10, 2019).
Thomson, J. J. (1985). The trolley problem. Yale Law J. 94:1395.
doi: 10.2307/796133
Trappl, R. (2016). Ethical systems for self-driving cars: an introduction. Appl. Artif.
Intell. 30, 745–747. doi: 10.1080/08839514.2016.1229737
Unity Technologies (2018). Unity. San Francisco, CA: Unity Technologies.
Wilson, H., Theodorou, A., and Bryson, J. J. (2019). “Slam the brakes: perceptions
of moral decisions in driving dilemmas,” in InternationalWorkshop in Artificial
Intelligence Safety (AISafety), IJCAI (Macau).
Wintersberger, P., Frison, A. K., and Riener, A. (2017). “The experience of ethics:
evaluation of self harm risks in automated vehicles,” in IEEE Intelligent Vehicles
Symposium (Los Angeles, CA). doi: 10.1109/IVS.2017.7995749
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Kallioinen, Pershina, Zeiser, Nosrat Nezami, Pipa, Stephan and
König. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in
other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s)
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2415
